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I. Introduction
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.[1]
{1} The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1791, is alluringly simple, yet has
presented its share of interpretative difficulties.[2] The subject of the right to a jury trial was raised at the
Constitutional Convention, but was probably discussed for less than an hour. The arguments raised against a
constitutional guarantee of a civil jury trial included the difficulty in drafting language distinguishing when a
jury trial was necessary, the variances among the states of the guarantee of civil jury trial, and the promise
that this issue be left to the First Congress.[3]Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist Number 83 that
the mere silence of the Constitution in regard to the right of a jury trial in civil cases did not abolish this right.
[4] The Seventh Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights, without discussion in the House.[5]
{2} On April 23, 1996, 205 years after the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, a unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court issued a decision written by Justice Souter in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.[6] The Justices
held that, under the Seventh Amendment, the construction of a patent is exclusively within the province of
the court. The Court used the "historical test," comparing patent interpretation in common law England in
1791 with patent interpretation today, and ruled that the court, not the jury, properly interprets patent claims.
The Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. landmark decision and its ramifications will be discussed in this
paper.
II. Patent Law
A. History of Patent Law
{3} The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
[7] Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the first patent act, the Patent Act of 1790, during the second
session of the First Congress. This act allowed one who "invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement not before known or used," to petition the Secretary of State,
the Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General to cause Letters Patent to be issued.[8]
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, played an active role in drafting the Patent Act of 1793,[9] which
repealed the Act of 1790 and allowed an inventor to obtain Letters Patent for "any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement."[10]
{4} The Act of 1836 "laid the foundation of the modern American system for [the] granting of patents."[11]
An applicant was required to file a specification;[12] the term "claim" was first used although a claim was not
mandated.[13] The Act required the applicant to particularly specify and identify the part, improvement, or
combination claimed as the applicant's own invention.[14] The Patent Act of 1870 completely rewrote the
law as promulgated in previous acts of Congress.[15] It stated that an applicant will be required to make a
claim that "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he
claims as his invention or discovery."[16]
{5} The latest revision and codification of patent law is the Patent Act of 1952,[17] which allows an inventor
to obtain a patent for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof."[18] To be patentable, an invention must be novel,[19] useful, and
nonobvious.[20]
{6} Under current law, a patent application must contain a specification that describes the invention in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.
[21] The specification must precisely set forth the invention for which a patent is solicited in order to
distinguish it from other inventions.[22]
B. Requirements Under the Patent Act
{7} The patent application must now also include one or more claims which particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention.[23] The Supreme Court stated in 1886 that "[t]he claim is
a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his
invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different
from the plain import of its terms."[24] Claims define the boundaries of a patent, and interpretation depends
on the specifications.[25] "More than one claim may be presented provided that they differ substantially from
each other and are not unduly multiplied."[26]
{8} A U.S. patent grants the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, or sell[27] the patented item. This right
begins the day the Patent and Trademark Office issues the patent and ends exactly twenty years after the
inventor files his or her application.[28] Patent owners may give notice of the patent by placing the word
"patent" or its abbreviation "pat." and the number on the article.[29] If the item was not marked, the patent
holder may recover damages for infringement only if the infringer continued the violation after notification.
[30] Remedies for infringement include an injunction,[31] damages (which may be trebled),[32] and, in
exceptional cases, attorney fees.[33]
C. The Role of Judge and Jury in Patent Cases
{9} "Prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that of
the American states."[34] In this early period, "juries were asked to determine whether the specification
described the invention well enough to allow members of the appropriate trace to reproduce it,"[35] but few
cases discussed the proper interpretation of specifications.[36] The few jury cases from this period show no
established jury practice, as juries were new to the field.[37]
{10} Based on the fundamental principle that the "construction of . . . written evidence is exclusively within
the court,"[38] the Supreme Court, since 1841, has consistently held that "the construction of a patent claim is
a matter of law exclusively for the court."[39] The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also initially held
that "claim construction was a matter of law."[40] The Federal Circuit, however, developed a second group of
cases that stated that there may be "jury triable fact issues in claim construction"[41] although other Federal
Circuit opinions held that "claim construction is strictly a question of law for the court."[42]
III. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Incorporated
A. Factual Background
{11} Markman is the named inventor and the owner of a patent for an "Inventory Control and Reporting
System for Dry-cleaning Stores."[43] The patent describes a system which includes a keyboard and a data
processor. The system generates written records and monitors and reports the status, location, and movement
of clothing in a dry-cleaning business. Markman's specification describes the invention in detail and states
that this inventory control system is "capable of monitoring and reporting (upon) the status, location, and
throughput of inventory,"[44] whereby "the progress of articles through the system can be completely
monitored."[45] This invention solves inventory-related problems in the dry-cleaning business, such as loss
of clothing. Even a small loss of inventory generates great consumer dissatisfaction.[46] The specification
states that the business owner can reconcile the inventory at any point in the sequence and can detect and
localize spurious additions and deletions to inventory.[47] Since the system ensures that no article of clothing
can go through the cleaning process without generating a written transaction, the system detects theft by
employees. The log created by the system can be compared with the cash register tape to detect theft when
the employee returns the clothing to the customer, pockets the proceeds and destroys the paperwork.[48]
{12} Markman sued Westview Instruments, Inc. (Westview) and Althonon for patent infringement of claims
1, 10, and 14 of his U.S. Reissue Patent Number 33,054. Westview produced the system accused of violating
Markman's patent, and Althonon used the device in one of its dry cleaning shops.[49] Westview responded
that it did not infringe upon Markman's patent because Westview's system merely records an inventory of
receivables, rather than recording and tracking an inventory of articles of clothing. The alleged infringing
device consisted of two pieces of equipment, the DATAMARK and the DATASCAN.[50]
{13} The case was tried before a jury to determine whether Westview's system infringed claims 1, 10, and 14
of Markman's patent. To find literal infringement, the jury had to find the accused device violated very
element of the claims as properly interpreted.[51] The jury found that Westview infringed independent claim
1 and dependent claim 10 but found no infringement on independent claim 14.
{14} Markman's first independent claim 1states that the Markman system can describe articles, maintain
inventory totals, generate reports including optically-detectable bar codes attachable to articles of clothing,
scan for codes along the cleaning process, and detect additions to inventory.[52] Markman's dependent claim
10 states that the input device of claim 1 is an alpha-numeric keyboard where single keys may be used to
enter attributes of items.[53]
{15} The district court granted Westview's deferred motion for judgment as a matter of law concerning
claims 1 and 10. The court found that the term "inventory" in claim 1 encompasses "both cash inventory and
the actual physical inventory of articles of clothing" and that Westview's system lacked this dual capacity.[54]
Therefore, the system did not infringe this claim.[55] Further, claims 1 and 10 define a data processor or
computer which has sufficient memory to record information for later use. Judge Katz reasoned since the
defendant's system does not have any memory capacity, it therefore does not infringe.[56] The district court
found that to infringe Markman's patent, a system must be able to track articles of clothing and generate
reports identifying the article's status and location. Since Westview's system did not track items throughout
the entire cleaning process, the district court directed a verdict on claims 1 and 10, overturning the jury's
findings, and found that Westview's system did not infringe. In concluding that the construction of patent
claims is a matter of law for the court, the district court focused on the plaintiff's patent claims for a
sophisticated inventory control system. These claims were found to differ from the defendant's rudimentary
device, which did not involve every element of the plaintiff's claims or perform the same function as the
claimed invention.[57] Thus, there was no literal or equivalent infringement.[58]
B. The Appeal
{16} Markman appealed the grant of judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement with regard to claims
1and 10 and argued that the district court should not have substituted its construction of the claim for the
jury's. Oral argument was held before a panel of the Federal Circuit in May of 1992. In November of 1993,
the Federal Circuit, sua sponte, ordered that the appeal be reheard en banc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
lower court decision, finding that it was undisputed that the Westview system did not and could not track
articles of clothing. Thus, they held there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of
infringement.[59]
{17} In reaching its decisions, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step patent infringement analysis whereby
the meaning and scope of the patent claims allegedly infringed are determined. The first step, claim
construction, is at issue here. The second step is comparing the properly construed claims to the device
accused of infringing.[60] Since its inception in 1981, the Federal Circuit has held claim construction was a
matter of law.[61] Although a significant line of cases have stated there may be jury-triable fact issues in a
claim construction, the courts have rarely based their holdings on this theory.[62] Notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that patent claim construction is a matter of law exclusively for the court.
[63]
{18} The Federal Circuit stated that a patent is uniquely suited for having its meaning and scope determined
by a court as a matter of law.[64] The Federal Circuit in Markman held that "[w]e therefore settle
inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation
to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim."[65] This holding does not
deprive the parties of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in patent infringement cases. Rather, "part
of the infringement inquiry, construing and determining the scope of the claims, is strictly a legal question for
the court."[66]
{19} One concurring opinion stated that while "the ultimate issue of patent scope, which depends on the legal
effect of the words of the claim, is a question of law," it does not "necessarily follow that the judge is to
decide every question arising during the course of claim construction as a matter of law."[67] The dissent
concluded that the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman denies the critical values of the trial and moves the
Federal Circuit out of the judicial mainstream.[68]
{20} In reaching the conclusion that the "interpretation and construction of patent claims" is a "matter of law
exclusively for the court,"[69] the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit settled inconsistencies in its
precedent.[70] The Federal Circuit stated that there is wisdom to this rule. Infringement may carry serious
consequences, and a competitor should be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty the ability of patent
holders to exclude others from their exclusive rights.[71]
C. U. S. Supreme Court
{21} On appeal the U. S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this decision.[72] Justice Souter's majority
opinion held that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is within the exclusive
province of the court.[73] The Court stated that the right of trial by jury existed under the English common
law when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.[74] Justice Story, in the 1812 case of United States v.
Wonson, set the standard for Seventh Amendment jurisprudence as the right preserved under English
common law when the amendment was adopted.[75] What is to be considered under the Seventh Amendment
"is not the common law of any individual state (for it probably differs in all), but is the common law of
England, that great reservoir of all our jurisprudence."[76] The Court cited its decision in Baltimore and
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman.[77] That case stated that the aim of the Seventh Amendment is to retain the
common-law distinction between the province of the court and that of the jury; "issues of law are to be
resolved by the court, and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury."[78]
{22} The Supreme Court first asked whether the cause of action in Markman was either tried at law, or
analogous to an action tried at law, at the time of the Founding.[79] The Court's analysis involved comparing
the "statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts
of law and equity."[80] Patent infringement actions were tried at law in 18th-century England, so the Court
then asked whether the particular decision must fall to the jury to preserve the substance of the common-law
right as it existed in 1791. The Court concluded that patent infringement cases must be tried to a jury, as their
predecessors were more than two centuries ago.[81]
{23} The second question asked by the Court was whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial,
here the construction of a patent claim, is itself necessarily a jury issue that is essential to a jury's resolution
of the ultimate dispute.[82] Citing its decision in Tull v. United States,[83] the Court said that it has
repeatedly stated that the answer to this second question depends on whether the jury must shoulder the
necessary responsibility to preserve the "substance of the common-law right of trial by jury."[84] Here there
is no clear answer, so the Court used the historical method of comparing the modern practice to earlier ones
whose allocation to court or jury is known.[85] At the time of the Seventh Amendment, the specification and
not the claim was the key to the patent.[86] The court found the closest 18th century analogy to modern claim
construction was specification construction. Claim practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the
Patent Act of 1836,[87] and inclusion of a claim did not become a statutory requirement until 1870.[88] The
first English reports show that judges construed patent specifications,[89] and the first cases from the
Supreme Court revealed that judges construed the patent.[90]
{24} The evidence of common law at the time of the Framing does not allow the application of the Seventh
Amendment's jury guarantee to the construction of a claim under the historical method. Therefore, the Court
examined precedent[91] and then considered both the interpretative skills of judges and juries and the
statutory policies.[92] Examining the precedent, Markman argued that two cases, Bischoff v. Wethered[93]
and Tucker v. Spalding,[94] show that evidence of the meaning of patent terms was offered to 19th-century
juries. Markman argued that these cases imply that the meaning of a documentary term was a jury issue
whenever it was subject to evidentiary proof. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found in
accordance with Bischoff the use of expert testimony on a question of construction does not require a judge to
submit the question to the jury. The Court has repeatedly drawn this fine line in patent cases between the role
of judge and jury.[95] The Court stated that the first issue of a simple patent case, construing the patent, is an
issue for the court, whereas the second issue, determining whether infringement occurred, is an issue for the
jury.[96]
{25} Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations play a part in the
choice between judge and jury. The Court next considered the relative interpretative skills of judges and
juries, and found that the fact/law distinction has, at times, turned on a determination that "one judicial actor
is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."[97] Souter, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted that this principle is true in patent cases, where judges are better suited to construct patent terms than
juries.[98]
{26} Markman argued that a jury should decide a question of meaning peculiar to a trade or profession
because such questions require credibility determinations. The Court, however, ruled that any credibility
determinations will be subsumed within the court's sophisticated analysis of the instrument as a whole.[99]
Thus, "[t]he decision maker vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to ascertain
whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve
the patent's internal coherence."[100]
{27} The last issue addressed was uniformity. While Markman's brief to the Court argued that having judges
interpret patent claims will not promote predictability or accuracy because different courts may arrive at
contradictory conclusions even if confronted with identical patent claims,[101] the Court held that
"uniformity in the treatment of a given patent is an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to
the court."[102] Otherwise, a 'zone of uncertainty' may arise, and it was just for the sake of uniformity that
Congress in 1981 "created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for
patent cases."[103] The Court stated that uniformity would "be ill served by submitting issues of
documentary construction to juries." The Court therefore held that the "interpretation of the word 'inventory'"
was "an issue for the judge, not the jury."[104]
IV. Impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
{28} What, then, is the importance of the Markman case aside from its being a scholarly and historical
discussion of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury as applied to current patent claims? Markman
clarifies that patent claim construction is a matter of law for the court. This grants judges leeway in patent
cases to interpret claims, thus relegating the jury's role to other issues, such as infringement. The Markman
decision thus clarifies the judge's role in patent cases. Judges may, as in Markman, deal with issues of claim
construction in motion form. The Markman decision will grant uniformity and expediency in patent claim
interpretations and will force inventors to write patent claims clearly to exactly describe the invention.
V. Conclusion
{29} Looking beyond patent cases, the Court used the historical method in its analysis of the Markman case,
comparing the modern practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know.[105] This
"historical test" states that in determining whether the Seventh Amendment requires that a jury be called to
decide a case, the court must be guided by the practice of English courts in 1791. This test has been
uniformly agreed upon over the last century and a half[106] and was adopted by Justice Story in U.S. v.
Wonson in 1812.[107] After Markman, Seventh Amendment litigants should continue to research the
historical record and argue it to the Court who, in Markman, found this method useful. At English common
law, judges were unsurprisingly charged with the general duty of interpreting documents because when the
Seventh Amendment was passed, English juries were often illiterate.[108] In the second half of the 18th
century, it has been reported that approximately twenty-two patent cases came before the courts of London,
with eight tried in the 1790's.[109] The Court in Markman held that the historical test stands to determine the
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury versus construction left to the court.
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Cable Ry. Co. v. Rowley, 155 U.S. 621, 625 91895); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265, 275 (1904).
40. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 976, citing SSIH Equip S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n., 718 F.2d 365, 376
(Fed. Cir. 1983); Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Fromsan v.
Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569-71 (Fed Cir. 1983); SRI Int'l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1118-22, 1138-40 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
41. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 976-77, citing McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bio-
Rad Labs, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762
F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986); H.H. Robinson
Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Perini America, Inc. v. Paper Converting
Machine Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
42. See Markman 52 F.3d at 977, citing Speciality Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir
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44. Markman 52 F.3d at 971.
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the transaction;
a data processor including memory operable to record said information and means to
maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to associate sequential
transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate at least one report of said
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and at least part of the written record bearing a portion to be attached to said articles;
and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to detect
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91. See Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1393, n.10. Since the Court concluded that precedent supports classifying the
question as one for the court, the Court did not decide either the extent to which the Seventh Amendment
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